Nigeria’s rotation favors North-South balance; allying North could secure Igbo VP or presidency post-2031. Fulanis, adept at negotiations and fulfilling pacts—as in backing Tinubu—could share power equitably
By Mohammed Bello Doka
Imagine a people forged in the fires of resilience, rising from the ashes of a brutal civil war only to wander the wilderness of Nigerian politics for over five decades, their dreams of true inclusion dangling like a mirage in the scorching sun. The Igbos—innovators, entrepreneurs, survivors—have watched as power slips through their fingers time and again, their voices drowned in the cacophony of ethnic rivalries and calculated alliances. Yet, in the shadow of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration, a new chapter unfolds, one that tugs at the heartstrings of a nation yearning for equity. Could it be that the very unity the South craves has become a Trojan horse, luring the Igbos into a structure that cements Yoruba dominance while sidelining their aspirations? As whispers of betrayal echo from the Southeast, we must pause and ask: Have the Igbos been tricked into a game where the rules were never in their favor?
To understand this poignant question, let’s lay the foundation with Nigeria’s turbulent history, where ethnic power dynamics have long been the undercurrent shaping destinies. Before independence in 1960, the Igbos stood tall in the political arena. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the iconic Zik of Africa, was a beacon of hope, leading the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) and becoming Nigeria’s first ceremonial president in 1963. The Eastern Region, predominantly Igbo, was a powerhouse of innovation and education, rivaling the North’s Hausa-Fulani dominance and the West’s Yoruba intellectualism. But the January 1966 coup, led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu—an Igbo—ignited fears of ethnic takeover, sparking counter-coups and pogroms that massacred thousands of Igbos in the North. What followed was the devastating Nigeria-Biafra War (1967–1970), a conflict that claimed over a million lives, mostly Igbos, and left scars that fester to this day. Post-war, General Yakubu Gowon’s “No victor, no vanquished” slogan rang hollow as Igbos faced economic strangulation—limited to £20 in savings regardless of pre-war wealth—and political exclusion. Since then, has an Igbo ever ascended to the presidency in a democratic Nigeria? Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi held power briefly in 1966, but no elected Igbo leader has followed. Instead, power has rotated between the Hausa-Fulani North (Buhari, Yar’Adua, Shagari) and Yoruba Southwest (Obasanjo, Tinubu), with brief interludes like Goodluck Jonathan’s South-South tenure. Isn’t this a pattern that begs the question: Why have the Igbos, one of Nigeria’s three major ethnic groups, been perpetually relegated to the sidelines?
Now, fast-forward to the present, where President Tinubu’s actions raise eyebrows and stir emotions. In August 2024, the Southern Nigeria Traditional Rulers Council (SNTRC) was inaugurated in Owerri, Imo State, with Tinubu’s presence and the Southern Governors’ Forum’s backing. There, governors and stakeholders from the South-West, South-East, and South-South reportedly unanimously appointed the Ooni of Ife, Oba Adeyeye Enitan Ogunwusi, as Permanent Chairman. Co-chairmen included the Obi of Obinugwu from Imo (Igbo) and King Jaja of Opobo from Rivers (Ijaw), suggesting initial inclusivity. But fast-forward to February 2026, and cracks appear. At a Tinubu-attended summit in Abuja, Enugu monarch Igwe Lawrence Agubuzu boldly declared, “There is nothing like a Southern Traditional Rulers Council,” warning against federal funding through it. The Ooni countered that membership is “optional” and “formidable,” open to all, including the Southeast. Yet, with the Ooni—a Yoruba icon—permanently at the helm, alongside the Sultan of Sokoto as Northern counterpart in the national council, one must ask: Did Tinubu’s high-profile endorsements and Villa meetings with these figures lure the Igbos into endorsing a structure that entrenches Yoruba leadership in the South, mirroring the very hegemony they decry in the North?
This question gains even more weight when we examine the shifting sands of Southeast politics under Tinubu’s watch. As of February 2026, the All Progressives Congress (APC)—Tinubu’s party—controls three of the five Southeast states: Imo (Hope Uzodimma), Ebonyi (Francis Nwifuru), and Enugu (Peter Mbah, who defected from PDP in late 2025). Anambra remains with APGA’s Charles Soludo, who has met Tinubu on non-partisan issues like infrastructure. Abia, under Labour Party’s Alex Otti, buzzes with rumors of his defection to APC, fueled by the party’s suspension of Abia congresses in February 2026—speculated as a move to accommodate him—though Otti and his party deny it, calling it “baseless propaganda.” Southeast APC governors and stakeholders, in January 2026, endorsed Tinubu for 2027, pledging “massive bloc votes” and hailing APC as “the most viable platform for Ndi Igbo.” But with these alignments, one wonders: Has Tinubu pocketed the Southeast’s political leadership, turning governors into allies who prioritize federal perks over regional autonomy? And if so, what does this mean for Peter Obi’s 2027 presidential ambition?
Peter Obi, the Labour Party’s 2023 candidate who garnered massive Southeast support, now faces a fractured landscape. With governors like Uzodimma, Nwifuru, and Mbah in APC’s fold, and Otti’s loyalty questioned amid denials, Obi’s base could erode. Reports from February 2026 suggest Obi’s defection to the African Democratic Congress (ADC) aims to build a broader coalition, but APC’s grip on Southeast structures might stifle his mobilization. If Southeast governors rally behind Tinubu in 2027, as pledged, does this jeopardize Obi’s bid? And with Obi’s insistence on contesting—vowing a single term focused on youth and economy—could his ambition clash with a region increasingly tied to APC’s machinery? These questions evoke a deep sense of loss: Has the dream of an Igbo presidency, embodied in Obi’s rise, been sidelined by Tinubu’s strategic embrace?
Looking ahead, if Tinubu secures re-election in 2027—a prospect bolstered by APC’s dominance in 29 states as of January 2026—power must return to the North in 2031, per Nigeria’s unwritten rotation norm. But rumors swirl: Is Tinubu grooming Nuhu Ribadu, the Fulani National Security Adviser from Adamawa, as successor? Former Rivers Governor Rotimi Amaechi alleged in February 2026 that Ribadu is “planning double elections”—propping Tinubu for 2027 while eyeing 2031 himself. Further whispers suggest Ribadu might hand power back to the Southwest, perhaps to Tinubu’s son, Seyi. With Ribadu’s ethnicity confirmed as Fulani and his pivotal role in Tinubu’s government, one must probe: Is Tinubu truly uniting the South against Fulani hegemony, or using Fulanis to entrench Yoruba dominance?
This duality pierces the heart when examining key Fulani figures in Tinubu’s administration. Ribadu, as NSA, wields immense influence over security—yet critics question if his role shields Fulani interests amid banditry. Speaker of the House Tajudeen Abbas, from Kaduna’s Zazzau Emirate (often linked to Hausa-Fulani heritage), leads the legislature. Aminu Bello Masari, former Katsina Governor (Hausa-Fulani), serves as North-West Renewed Hope Ambassador, coordinating Tinubu’s agenda. These appointments evoke emotional turmoil: With Fulanis in such positions, is Tinubu combating the hegemony that has marginalized Igbos since the civil war, or co-opting it for his own ends? Fulanis, known for understanding power and fulfilling promises—as seen in their support making Tinubu president—now hold sway. But for Igbos, who have faced exclusion, does this signal betrayal?
The disparity hits harder in cases like Nnamdi Kanu versus Sunday Igboho. Kanu, IPOB leader, remains detained since 2021, facing terrorism charges—his trial ongoing amid appeals, no final life sentence yet. Igboho, released from Benin Republic in 2022 after exile, walks free. Tinubu’s aide, Sunday Dare, distinguished them in February 2026: Kanu as insurrectionist causing over 700 deaths and Southeast paralysis, Igboho as defender against herders, advocating peacefully. Yet, both sought secession—Kanu for Biafra, Igboho for Yoruba Nation. Under Nigeria’s constitution, both could face treason. Why jail one and free the other? Dare’s comments fuel anguish: Is this ethnic bias, with Yoruba Igboho hailed as activist and Igbo Kanu branded terrorist?
Recall Muhammadu Buhari’s overtures: In 2003, he chose Chuba Okadigbo (Igbo from Anambra) as running mate under ANPP; in 2007, Edwin Ume-Ezeoke (Igbo from Anambra). Both bids promised Igbo handover, yet Igbos distrusted the pro-Fulani leader, voting against him. Buhari’s regimes deepened marginalization, with minimal Igbo appointments. Does this history underscore Igbos’ folly in aligning with Yorubas—who compete for Southern slots—while fighting Fulanis, potential Northern allies for power-sharing?
Logically, Igbos stand to gain more from Northern alliances. Nigeria’s rotation favors North-South balance; allying North could secure Igbo VP or presidency post-2031. Fulanis, adept at negotiations and fulfilling pacts—as in backing Tinubu—could share power equitably. But Yoruba alignment pits Igbos against Southwestern rivals for Southern turns, diluting leverage. Isn’t this self-sabotage, especially with SE governors in APC?
Internationally, ethnic alliances yield power. In Kenya, post-2007 violence (over 1,000 dead from Kikuyu-Luo clashes), Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu) allied William Ruto (Kalenjin) in Jubilee Coalition, winning 2013/2017, stabilizing via inclusion—though 2022 saw Ruto’s “hustler” narrative transcend ethnicity. Rwanda’s post-1994 genocide unity government under Paul Kagame integrated Hutu-Tutsi, fostering stability despite criticisms. In India, BJP’s coalitions with regional castes (e.g., Dalits in Uttar Pradesh) secured power, showing alliances bridge divides for shared gains. Why not emulate: Igbos allying North for presidency, rather than Yoruba rivalry?
If Igbos lose Obi’s shot at power—as president or VP—the Igbo presidency dream may hibernate indefinitely. With SE structures APC-aligned, Obi’s ADC move risks isolation. Emotional stakes are high: A people who endured war’s horrors, rebuilt without aid, now face diluted ambitions. Have Igbos been tricked—lured into Southern “unity” under Yoruba chairs, political alignments eroding autonomy, while Fulanis entrench in Tinubu’s govt?
As Nigeria teeters, these questions pierce the soul: Did Tinubu’s maneuvers—from Ooni’s elevation to SE governor flips—outfox Igbos, trading dreams for illusions? Have Igbos lost Biafra’s spirit and Obi’s promise to Tinubu’s craft? Will they ever smell presidency, or muster guts for self-determination? Amid Fulani power plays, is Tinubu dismantling hegemony or forging Yoruba one? Ultimately, have the Igbos been tricked? The answer, dear reader, may lie in awakening before it’s too late.
•Mohammed Bello Doka can be reached via bellodoka82@gmail.com
•Opinions, positions or thoughts expressed here are personal and strictly of the writer/author and do not represent the views of The Daily Crucible.
